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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a model protection method
by using block-wise pixel shuffling with a secret key as a
preprocessing technique to input images for the first time. The
protected model is built by training with such preprocessed
images. Experiment results show that the performance of the
protected model is close to that of non-protected models when
the key is correct, while the accuracy is severely dropped when
an incorrect key is given, and the proposed model protection is
robust against not only brute-force attacks but also fine-tuning
attacks, while maintaining almost the same performance accuracy
as that of using a non-protected model.
Index Terms—Model Protection, Preprocessing, Pixel Shuffling
I. INTRODUCTION
Training a successful deep neural network (DNN) model is
of great value because model training requires a huge amount
of data and fast computing resources (e.g., GPU-accelerated
computing). Moreover, algorithms used in training a DNN
model may be patented or have restricted licenses. Considering
expenses on expertise, money and time to train a DNN model,
it should be regarded as a kind of intellectual property. While
distributing a trained model, an illegal party may obtain the
model and use it for its own service.
To protect the copyright of trained DNN models, researchers
have adopted digital watermarking technology to embed wa-
termarks into DNNs [1]–[8]. These works focus on identifying
the ownership of a model in question. In reality, a stolen
model can still be exploited in many different ways such as
model inversion attacks [9], adversarial attacks [10], internal
business gains, etc. without being suspicious. To the best of our
knowledge, consequences of a stolen model is not considered
before in model protection research except for ownership
verification. In this work, we focus on protecting a model from
misuses when the model is stolen by taking an inspiration from
an adversarial defense.
Recently, a key-based adversarial defense was proposed to
combat adversarial examples [11], that was in turn inspired by
perceptual image encryption methods, which were proposed
for privacy-preserving machine learning and encryption-then-
compression systems [12]–[17]. The uniqueness of the key
towards the model in the work [11] motivates us to adopt a
key-based transformation technique for model protection.
Therefore, in this work, we propose a model protection
method with a key in such a way that a stolen model cannot
be used without the key for the first time. Specifically, the
proposed method preprocesses input images with a secret key
and trains the model by using such preprocessed images. The
preprocessing technique used in the proposed method is a
low-cost block-wise pixel shuffling operation. In addition, the
proposed method does not modify the network, and therefore,
there is no overhead in both training and inference time. In
an experiment, the performance of a protected model by the
proposed method is demonstrated not only to be close to that
of non-protected one when the key is correct, but also to be
significantly dropped upon incorrect keys.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Model Protection
1) Ownership Verification: Ownership verification is a con-
cept to protect intellectual property of DNN models, in which
digital watermarking techniques are adopted to embed water-
marks into DNN models like copyright protection of media
contents. A rightful owner embeds a watermark into a model
during training of the model by an embedding regularizer.
When the model is in question, the watermark is extracted
with an embedding parameter from the model. The ownership
is verified by using the extracted watermark to detect the
intellectual property of copyright infringement.
2) Key-based Model Protection: In ownership verification
schemes, the performance of the protected model (i.e., fidelity)
is independent of the embedded watermark. In other words,
stolen models protected with watermarking can still work well,
regardless of the ownership. The copyright of the ownership
can only be claimed when the stolen model is in question.
As Fan et. al [3] pointed out, conventional ownership verifi-
cation schemes are vulnerable against ambiguity attacks [18].
Therefore, they proposed passport layers in the network and
passports to defend ambiguity attacks. In this work, we intro-
duce a novel concept of model protection that is controlled by
a key for the first time. The proposed model protection does
not require any additional layer in the network. We call such
a model protection method as key-based model protection.
B. Related Work
There are two forms of model protection of DNN models:
white-box and black-box.
1) White-box: In this ownership verification scheme, the
watermark is embedded to model weights by an embedding
regularizer during training. Therefore, the access to the model
weights is required for extracting the watermark embedded in
the model as in [1], [3], [5], [7].
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2) Black-box: An inspector observes the input and output
of a model in doubt to verify the ownership in black-box
ownership verification schemes. These black-box approaches
exploits adversarial examples as a backdoor trigger set [6],
[8], or a set of training examples is utilized in a way that
a watermark pattern can be extracted from the inference of
the model by the specific set of training examples [2]–[4].
Therefore, the access to the model weights is not required to
verify the ownership in the black-box approaches.
Although most of all conventional works focus on owner-
ship identification, a state-of-the-art work [3] also introduced
the notion of passports (i.e., a stolen model cannot be used
without a correct passport). However, the passport in [3] is a
set of extracted features from a pre-trained model where an
input is an image or a set of images, or equivalent random
patterns. In addition, the network is modified with passport
layers that use passports. Therefore, there are significant
overhead costs in both training and inference time, in addition
to user-unfriendly management of lengthy passports in [3].
III. PROPOSED METHOD
A. Overview
The idea of the proposed model protection method is to
preprocess input images with a secret key before training or
testing a model. An overview of the proposed method is de-
picted in Fig. 1. A model (f ) is trained by preprocessed images
with a key (K) for the first time. To test the trained model,
test images are also preprocessed with the same key K before
testing. The next subsection details the preprocessing that is
used in the proposed model protection method. This work
has been inspired by perceptual encryption methods [12]–[17]
including an adversarial defense [11].
Fig. 1. Overview of proposed model protection method.
B. Preprocessing
Basically, block-wise pixel shuffling operation with a secret
key is utilized as a preprocessing technique in the proposed
model protection method. The following are steps for prepro-
cessing input images, where c, w and h denote the number of
channels, width and height of an image tensor x ∈ [0, 1]c×w×h
(see also Fig. 2).
1) Divide x into blocks with a size of M such that
{B(1,1), . . . , B( wM , hM )}.
2) Transform each block tensor B(i,j) into a vector b(i,j) =
[b(i,j)(1), . . . , b(i,j)(c×M ×M)].
3) Generate a random permutation vector v =
[v1, . . . , vk, . . . , vk′ , . . . , vc×M×M ] with a key (K),
where vk 6= vk′ if k 6= k′, and permutate every vector
b(i,j) with v as
b′(i,j)(k) = b(i,j)(vk), (1)
to obtain a shuffled vector b′(i,j) =
[b′(i,j)(1), . . . , b
′
(i,j)(c×M ×M)]
4) Integrate the shuffled vectors to form a shuffled image
tensor x′ ∈ [0, 1]c×w×h.
For visualization purposes, example of preprocessed images
in different block sizes are shown in Fig. 3.
C. Key Space
Key space K of key K used in the proposed preprocessing
depends on the number of pixels in a block. It is defined as
K(c×M ×M) = (c×M ×M)!. (2)
Therefore, with respect to block size M , the key space will
vary.
D. Training/Testing a Model
A model (f ), is trained by minibatches of images
throughout the dataset iteratively. Let a minibatch (S)
be {(x(1), y(1)), . . . , (x(m), y(m))} with m samples, where
(x(n), y(n)) is a pair of an input image and a class label of nth
sample (n ∈ {1, . . . ,m}). During training, each batch is first
augmented as in a normal training procedure (e.g., random
cropping, random horizontal flip) and then, preprocessed with
a secret key as shown in Section III-B to obtain a preprocessed
minibatch S′ = {(x′(1), y(1)), . . . , (x′(m), y(m))}. Model f
is trained by using all the preprocessed minibatch S′ of the
dataset.
Similarly, a test image is also preprocessed with the same
key without any augmentation.
E. Requirements for Key-based Model Protection
We consider a model protection scenario that aims to fulfill
the following requirements:
1) Usability: A rightful user with key K can access the
model without any noticeable overhead in both training
and inference time, and performance degradation. The
key management should be easy.
2) Unusability: Ideally, stolen models should not be usable
in any case without key K. In addition, even when the
adversary retrains a stolen model with a forged key, the
performance of the model should be heavily dropped.
Fig. 2. Preprocessing of proposed model protection method.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3. Example of preprocessed images in different block sizes. (a) Original
image. (b) M = 2. (c) M = 4. (d) M = 8.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
A. Experiment Set-up
We conducted image classification experiments on CIFAR-
10 dataset [19] with a batch size of 128 and live augmentation
(random cropping with padding of 4 and random horizontal
flip) on a training set. CIFAR-10 consists of 60,000 color
images (dimension of 32 × 32 × 3) with 10 classes (6000
images for each class) where 50,000 images are for training
and 10,000 for testing. We used deep residual networks [20]
with 18 layers (ResNet18) and trained for 200 epochs with
cyclic learning rates [21] and mixed precision training [22].
The parameters of the stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
optimizer were: momentum of 0.9, weight decay of 0.0005
and maximum learning rate of 0.2.
B. Results
We trained three protected models by preprocessed images
with a secret key in different block sizes (M ∈ {2, 4, 8}), and
also a non-protected model (i.e., baseline model). To verify
the effectiveness of the proposed model protection method,
we tested the protected models against a wrong key K ′, plain
images (without preprocessing), and fine-tuning attacks to
adapt a wrong key K ′. Table I summarizes simulation results.
Usability: When key K was given, the performance accu-
racy was closer to the baseline accuracy. The management of
the key is straight forward and there is no noticeable overhead
in both training and inference time.
Unusability: When the key was not correct, the accuracy
was drastically decreased. Moreover, when the protected mod-
els were tested with plain images, the performance accuracy
was also significantly reduced, that implies the protected
models are not usable without preprocessing input images with
key K.
Comparing with Scheme V1 [3] which is an ownership ver-
ification method with passports, the accuracy of the proposed
protected model is comparable. However, V1 [3] needs over-
heads in both training and inference time for having passport
layers in the network, and management of lengthy passports.
In contrast, the proposed model protection method does not
require any overhead and has a simpler key management.
C. Robustness Against Fine-tuning Attacks
Fine-tuning (transfer learning) [23] is training a model on
top of pre-trained weights. Since fine-tuning alters weights
of the model, an attacker may use fine-tuning as an attack to
overwrite the protected model with the intent of forging a key.
We considered such an attacking scenario (fine-tuning attack)
where the adversary has a subset of dataset D′ and retrains
the model with a forged key (K ′) for 30 epochs. We ran an
experiment with different sizes of the adversary’s dataset (i.e.,
|D′| ∈ {100, 500, 1000}). Although the accuracy improved
with respect to the size of the adversary’s dataset, it was still
way lower than the performance of the correct key as presented
in Table I.
D. Future Work for Key Security
As the key is the nucleus of the proposed model protection
method, the key should be secure and hard to be estimated.
An attacker may approximate the correct key after stealing
the model. Since the attacker has stolen the model, he may
try many different keys or improve a key by observing the
accuracy or the loss. We shall investigate key sensitivity of
the proposed model protection method and also improve the
key space of the proposed method in our future work.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a model protection method that utilizes block-
wise pixel shuffling with a key to preprocess input images.
The performance accuracy of the protected model was closer
to that of non-protected model when the key was correct
and it dropped drastically when the incorrect key was given
suggesting the protected model is not usable even when the
model is stolen. Moreover, the proposed model protection
method does not introduce any overhead in both training and
inference time. The proposed method is also robust against
TABLE I
ACCURACY (%) OF THE PROTECTED MODELS AND BASELINE MODEL COMPARING WITH A CONVENTIONAL METHOD
Model Correct Incorrect Plain Attack 1 Attack 2 Attack 3
K K′ |D′| = 100 |D′| = 500 |D′| = 1000
M = 2 94.70 25.84 34.39 18.59 34.44 46.45
M = 4 92.26 20.01 27.11 13.33 30.54 45.46
M = 8 86.98 14.98 15.70 12.57 33.08 40.22
Baseline 95.45 (Not protected)
Scheme V1 [3] 94.62 10 (Used passports instead of a key)
fine-tuning attacks considering the adversary has a small
subset of training dataset to adapt a new forged key.
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